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Abstract
The paper formalizes the intuition that brands are consumed for image reasons and
that advertising creates a brand’s image. The key idea is that advertising informs the pub-
lic of brand names and creates the possibility of conspicuous consumption by rendering
brands a signalling device. In a price competition framework, we show that advertising
increases consumers’ willingness to pay and thus provide a foundation, based on optimiza-
tion behavior, for persuasive approaches to advertising. Moreover, an incumbent might
strategically overinvest in advertising to deter entry, there might be too much advertising,
and competition might be socially undesirable.
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1 Introduction
The paper formalizes the intuition that consumers use brands for image reasons and that
it is advertising that establishes a brand’s image.1 We consider a conspicuous consumption
setup where image concerned consumers make choices so as to influence others’ (the public’s)
views about themselves.2 The basic idea to capture the image-creating role of advertising is
to posit that advertising informs the public of brand names.3 In doing so, advertising renders
brands a potential signalling device, and a product’s image may emerge endogenously as the
equilibrium outcome of a signalling game played between consumers and the public. Thus,
we view advertising as a necessary requirement for establishing a product’s image: without
advertising, goods would be indistinguishable and could not acquire the distinct meaning that
allows conspicuous consumption.4
Our approach yields a number of positive and normative results that are novel to the
advertising literature. Most notably, the paper contributes to the discussion on the entry
deterring effects of advertising. While early authors (see e.g. Braithwaite 1928, Robinson
1933) argue that an incumbent monopolist may increase his advertising to deter entry, Bagwell
(2003, p. 116) concludes in his recent review that this intuition “is not strongly supported
by the existing theoretical models that emphasize advertising’s possible goodwill effects5.” In
contrast to this literature, this paper confirms the early views and shows that an incumbent
might strategically overinvest in advertising to deter entry. In addition, the paper derives
welfare implications of advertising that have not been the focus of the advertising literature.
More specifically, we consider a price competition framework where advertising sellers
(brands) inform a fraction of the public of their names and so make their good partially
1This idea is suggested by a large literature in consumer research and marketing. We review this literature
below.
2The idea goes back to Veblen (1899). We use a model in the spirit of more recent accounts such as Bernheim
(1995), Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Pesendorfer (1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997).
3This is a key departure from the informative advertising literature in the tradition of Butters (1977) which
assumes that the purpose of advertising is to inform consumers of the existence of firms.
4The marketing literature often views advertising as a more powerful tool and seems to suggest that it can
directly influence a product’s image through the style of the advertising campaign, image appeals, the form of
the logo, the packaging etc. See, e.g., Park et al. (1986) or Johar and Sirgy (1991).
5Advertising creates goodwill if it creates captive consumers who consider purchasing from the seller only
from whom they received an ad.
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conspicuous. Free entry ensures that the good is always available at marginal cost from a
no-name seller who does not advertise. To analyze the post-advertising pricing game, we draw
on well-known features from the conspicuous consumption literature: in order to create the
brand’s signalling value (its image), advertising sellers raise prices so as to prevent some con-
sumer types from purchasing their good. Thus, the market becomes endogeneously segmented:
strongly image concerned consumers buy in the “premium segment” (at mark-up prices) and
obtain a favourable image; and less image concerned consumers buy in the “budget segment”
(at marginal cost) and obtain an unfavourable image.6 Despite Bertrand competition, pre-
mium prices do not fall, as price reductions would pool consumer types and destroy the brand’s
image.7
Our main results are driven by how the pricing equilibrium affects a brand’s advertising
incentives. All else equal, a premium consumer prefers a brand with higher advertising, because
advertising raises the likelihood that the brand is recognized and that the consumer obtains his
preferred image. Therefore, advertising is a competitive advantage in the premium segment.
Thus, the equilibrium displays three noteworthy positive features. First, advertising directly
increases a consumers’ willingness to pay for a brand. Hence, the model provides a foundation,
based on optimization behaviour, for persuasive approaches to advertising that simply posit
that advertising shifts out (inverse) demand (see e.g. Dixit and Normann 1978). Second, the
endogeneous market segmentation admits an interpretation of advertising in terms of product
differentiation: because different products carry different images, consumers have heterogeneous
preferences over otherwise homogeneous goods.8
Finally, the setup provides a rationale for the everyday observation that many ads do not
contain useful product information. In an experience good context, the Nelson (1974) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) tradition explains this observation by arguing that advertising
is a costly signal of unobservable quality. Our story might explain why sellers of life-style
6Throughout the formal analysis, we assume that there is exactly one ideal image that all consumers strive
for (for example, to be “cool” versus to be a “bore”). If they do not obtain this image, they obtain an image loss
(“stigma”). The other case, in which different consumers have different ideal images, is discussed informally.
7Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) argue that equilibrium prices above marginal cost are an artefact of the
assumption that consumers consume only one unit at a time. We shall comment on this in more detail below.
8In his classic study on the US manufacturing industry, Bain (1956, p.101) concludes: “The single most
important basis for product differentiation in the consumer-good industry is apparently advertising.”
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products with little experience characteristics such as cigarettes, fashion clothes, or soft-drinks
often appear to aim at maximum publicity through funny, shocking or otherwise eye-catching
campaigns and try to associate their product with a distinct public image.9
To study entry, we adopt Schmalensee’s (1983) seminal framework, in which brands advertise
sequentially before competing in the post-entry market. In the current setup, the incumbent
can deter entry, because in order to make sales, the entrant needs to “overbid” the incumbent’s
advertising. Thus, by increasing her advertising, the incumbent can reduce the profitability
of entry. The overinvestment result holds if brands can sustain relatively high mark-ups. In
this case, overbidding tends to generate large gains in the post-entry game, and only heavy
advertising by the incumbent makes entry unprofitable. As a result, entry is effectively impeded
in the sense of Bain.10 Conversely, when mark-ups are relatively small, entry is already deterred
when the incumbent advertises like a monopolistic brand without an entry threat, i.e. entry is
blockaded in the sense of Bain.
To the best of our knowledge, this result is new to the literature in which the purpose of
advertising is to increase a seller’s publicity.11 Specifically, in Schmalensee (1983) advertising
informs consumers and firms compete in quantities. He establishes that the incumbent under-
invests so as to commit to be more aggressive in the post-entry game. Ishigaki (2000) replaces
Schmalensee’s quantity by a price competition framework and finds that entry is at most block-
aded but never effectively impeded. Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) do identify conditions where
the incumbent overinvests. However, the incumbent does so to accommodate, not to deter
entry. When entry deterrence is optimal instead, the incumbent underinvests.
After the discussion on entry, we analyze implications for welfare and competition. Adver-
tising exerts a negative externality on “budget consumers” since it increases the likelihood that
they obtain a negative image (“stigma”). A monopolistic brand does not internalize this detri-
mental effect and consequently advertises too much. Moreover, in monopoly also the “premium
9A case in point is celebrity advertising which attempts to utilize the celebrity’s publicity and to link the
brand with attributes and values the celebrity stands for (see McCracken 1989).
10In Bain’s (1956) classification, entry is blockaded when monopoly behaviour deters entry; entry is effectively
impeded when the incumbent deters entry by changing her behaviour as compared to a monopolist without
entry threat; and entry is easy otherwise.
11Overinvestment however occurs in models of limit-pricing where a privately informed incumbent deters
entry by overinvesting in advertising so as to signal demand or cost conditions (see Bagwell and Ramey 1988,
1990). In our model, sellers do not have private information.
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consumers” do not benefit from advertising, because their image gain is entirely appropriated
by the monopolist. Thus, an advertising ban would be in the interest of consumers.
Our setup also gives rise to some unconventional implications with respect to competition.
When two brands advertise simultaneously, advertising takes on the form of an all-pay auction.
Brands will then expend all their prospective profits in the advertising contest in an attempt
to win an advantage in the post-advertising pricing game. The losing seller’s advertising does
not contribute to a consumer’s image and is thus pure waste from a welfare perspective. In this
sense, competition lowers welfare.12
With regard to consumer rents, competition makes premium consumers better off, because
it stimulates price competition between brands. In contrast, it makes budget consumers worse
off through the increased advertising it encourages.
These results appear to confirm concerns widespread among political activists who denounce
advertising as a consumer rip-off and advocate advertising bans (see e.g. Klein 2000). How-
ever, they rest critically on the assumption that all consumers share the same ideal image (see
fotenote 6). If this is not the case, advertising is generally beneficial, as it enables consumers
to “express themselves.” We discuss the latter case informally.
Literature and background
Our work is most closely related to previous work on conspicuous consumption that adopts a
signalling perspective, in particular Coelho and McClure (1993), Bagwell and Bernheim (1996),
Pesendorfer (1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997). Our paper shares with these papers the basic
feature of market segmentation through mark-up pricing.13 In contrast to our paper however,
in most of these papers, the public can identify consumption choices by assumption. Thus,
there is no role for advertising. An exception is Pesendorfer (1995) where sellers can create
new designs at a fixed cost. Creating a design is similar to advertising in our setup. How-
ever, Pesendorfer’s focus is very different from ours. He looks at intertemporal price patterns
and fashion cycles but does not study entry deterrence. Moreover, in contrast to his setup,
where once a design is created everyone can distinguish it from an old design, we assume that
advertising changes a brand’s publicity in a continuous way. This gives rise to the possibility
12Somewhat ironically, from this perspective the entry deterrence result mentioned above is not too worrisome.
13See also Bernheim (1995) for a treatment with exogenous prices.
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that the public is partially unable to distinguish brands and it renders advertising an all-pay
auction. While he also points out the detrimental effects of competition on social surplus, we
have a more detailed analysis of consumer rents.
Our work is inspired by a large consumer research literature on symbolic consumption.
Starting with the seminal work of Levy (1959), the theory of symbolic consumption views
consumption goods as meaningful symbols that can be used to satisfy self-presentation needs
(see also Belk 1988). Social psychologists distinguish between strategic and expressive self-
presentation motives. The former aims at influencing others’ views of oneself, whereas the
latter aims at constructing the self and an identity for oneself (see Baumeister (1998) for a
review).14 In the context of consumption, the self-presentation function of goods and possessions
is supported by several empirical and experimental studies (e.g. Prentice 1987, Richins 1994).15
The literature suggests that branding and advertising plays a central role in the process of
attaching a specific symbolic meaning to a good. In their classic contribution, Gardner and
Levy (1955) argue that possessing a particular image is the distinctive feature of a brand as
opposed to a commodity. According to their view, a brand’s image is created by “advertising,
merchandising, promotion, publicity, and even sheer length of existence” (p. 35).16
The most convincing empirical support for the hypothesis that brands are in fact used
to satisfy self-presentation needs comes from Aaker (1999).17 Aaker asked subjects to evalu-
ate brands in terms of the situations in which they typically use them. On the basis of the
self-presentation motive, Aaker develops several hypotheses that predict brand preferences de-
pending on subject characteristics such as image concerns and situation characteristics such
as social reference group and finds strong support for the premise that brand images influence
purchasing behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup. Section 3 analyzes the
signalling game. Section 4 derives the entry deterrence effect, and section 5 studies welfare
14The economics literature on conspicious consumption often assumes that self-presentation is instrumental
for matching purposes at a post-consumption stage. Similarly, we shall focus on the strategic motive and discuss
the expressive motive informally.
15Solomon (1983) extends the self-expression view and claims that the symbolic nature of consumption goods
might also provide role scripts that prescribe behaviors in particular situations.
16For an empirical study on the influence of advertising on a product’s image and on how conumers react to
different image appeals see Snyder and DeBono (1985).
17See also Aaker (1997).
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properties. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The setup
There are two sellers, S1 and S2, who can each produce one unit of a good at 0 marginal cost.
We refer to S1 and S2 as brands. In addition, the good is supplied by a no-name seller, S0, at
a fixed price p0 = 0.18 There are two consumer types t ∈ T = {H,L}. A type might represent
a particular life-style, views about the world, wealth, etc. The proportion of type t in the
consumer population is µt ≥ 0, and the population size is normalized to 1. A type is this type’s
private information. In addition, there is a public of mass 1. The public is distinct from the
consumers and does not consume a good.19
Consumers seek to signal a particular type to the public and use brands to do so. We
assume that each good carries the seller’s name. The idea is that it is the brand name that
makes the good conspicuous and thus renders it a potential signalling device. For simplicity,
attaching a name to the good is assumed to be costless. Ex ante, consumers know brand names,
but the public does not. The purpose of advertising is thus to inform the public (and not the
consumers) about brand names and thereby to increase the probability with which the brand
is recognized by the public. More precisely, the game proceeds in three stages, an advertising
stage, a pricing stage, and a consumption stage.
In the advertising stage, S1 and S2 inform the public of their names. The no-name seller has
prohibitively high advertising costs and does not advertise.20 Specifically, brand Sb, b = 1, 2,
informs a fraction αb ∈ [0, 1] of the public of her brand name. Doing so costs c (αb) = (1/2) cα2b
with c > 0.21 We consider both sequential and simultaneous advertising. In the sequential case,
S1 moves first, and S2 can observe α1 before making her advertising choice.
When a member of the public receives an ad from a brand, she becomes able to distinguish
this brand from all other sellers (including the no-name seller). We represent the public’s
knowledge by the index k ∈ K = {∅, 1, 2, (1, 2)}. E.g., if a member of the public receives an
18This is a convenient way to capture free entry. We would obtain the same results by considering a large
number of sellers with endogenous pricing. Bertrand competition would then lead some of these sellers to supply
the good at marginal cost.
19This assumption is common in the literature and keeps the analysis simple.
20Endogenizing the no-name seller’s advertising choice would yield similar results.
21Any other standard cost function would do.
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ad from S2 only, but not from S1, then k = 2, and she can distinguish brand S2 from all other
sellers, but not brand S1 from the no-name seller. If she does not receive any ad, then k = ∅,
and if she receives both ads, then k = (1, 2). We denote the probability of k by ρk.22
In the pricing stage, after observing all moves by S1 and S2 in the previous stage, S1 and
S2 simultaneously choose prices p1 and p2. We denote the profile of prices by p = (p0, p1, p2).
In the consumption stage, a consumer observes all moves of the previous stages and chooses
whether and from which seller to purchase the good. For simplicity, we assume that a consumer
always prefers the free no-name product to not consuming at all. So without loss of generality,
the consumer’s choice set is I = {0, 1, 2}.
After his consumption choice, the consumer is randomly matched with a member of the
public, referred to as the consumer’s (social) contact.23 The contact draws inferences about the
consumer’s type on the basis of her knowledge of brand names, the consumer’s choice, and the
distribution of prices24. For i ∈ I let γkt (i|p) be the contact’s belief that the consumer is of
type t conditional on having received advertisement k and on being matched with a consumer
who chose i. If his contact holds belief γH = γkH (i|p), consumer type t obtains overal utility25
ut = u+ λtγH ,
where u > 0 is the intrinsic utility and λtγH represents the image utility of the good. u is
assumed to be the same across consumer types and sellers, i.e. with regard to its intrinsic
features (e.g. quality) the good is homogeneous.
The sign of λt determines the ideal image of type t. If λt ≥ 0, then type t wants to appear
as type H, and if λt < 0, then type t wants to appear as type L. We assume that both types
want to appear as type H, i.e. λH ,λL > 0.26 For example, the image utility might reflect the
social esteem transferred to H-types and the shame suffered by L-types due to the presence
of a social norm that favours H-types (e.g. H-types are cool, L-types are bores), hence the
notation H for “high” and L for “low”.
22For example, ρ1,2 = α1α2.
23This term is borrowed from Bagwell and Bernheim (1996).
24One might question that a contact knows the price of a brand of which he did not receive an ad. However, if
this assumption is relaxed, the contact would need to hold endogenous beliefs about prices. This raises technical
issues that are beyond the scope of the paper.
25This formulation of utility is similar to Bernheim (1995).
26We shall comment on the case λL < 0 below.
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In what follows, the types’ relative intensity to appear as type H will be important. Let
σ =
λL
λH
> 0.
With this specification, consumer type t’s expected utility from choosing brand i at price pi is
ut (i, pi|γ) = u+
X
k∈K
λtγkH (i|p) ρk − pi.
We define a consumer type t’s incentive to choose i rather than j by
∆ut (i, j|p, γ) = u (i, pi|p)− ut (j, pj|p)
= λt
X
k∈K
¡
γkH (i|p)− γkH (j|p)
¢
ρk − pi + pj. (1)
Finally, all of what was said so far is common knowledge among the players.
3 Pricing and consumption
In this section, we describe the outcome of the price competition game after sellers have made
their advertising choices. Without loss of generality, α1 ≥ α2. For α1 < α2, the same results
hold with a change of indices.
Taking as given α1 and α2, the players’ strategies are as follows. A seller’s strategy is a
price choice pi ∈ R+, and a consumer type t’s strategy dt (i, p) denotes the probability that
type t chooses i, given p. In addition, the public’s belief is given by the belief function γkt (i|p)
introduced in the previous section.
A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a collection p, dH , dL, γ such that a player’s strategy
maximizes his utility given the other players’ strategies and the public’s beliefs; and the public’s
beliefs are, whenever possible, Bayesian consistent with sellers’ and consumers’ strategies as well
as its knowledge of brand names. As usual in signalling games, there are multiple equilibria in
the consumption game following sellers’ price choices. We now describe how we select equilibria.
We focus on (fully) separating equilibria, where different types make different choices, and
pooling equilibrium where all types choose the same seller.27 The following observation is
useful.
27We do not consider semi-separating equilibria in which a type mixes between a brand and the no-name
seller. This is for simplicity only and not substantial.
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Lemma 1 In any separating equilibrium, type L consumes at price 0.
In a separating equilibrium, an L-type is identified as type L indeed. Thus, he obtains the
worst possible image. Thus, he cannot lose from purchasing the no-name good at price 0.
In light of Lemma 1, we consider separating equilibria only in which an L-type chooses the
no-name good.28 In such an equilibrium, two incentive constraints per type have to hold. Type
H has to purchase from one of the two brands, and type L must not purchase from a brand.
Formally, (1) implies the following incentive compatibility conditions:
∆uH (1, 0|γ) ≥ 0 or ∆uH (2, 0|γ) ≥ 0, (ICH)
∆uL (1, 0|γ) ≤ 0 and ∆uL (2, 0|γ) ≤ 0, (ICL)
where γ is a belief consistent with separation.29
In addition, we employ two further selection criteria. First, if there are two separating
equilibria, we shall select the equilibrium in which the H-type is better off. This captures the
intuitive idea that brands compete for the H-type. Second, we require that in any separating
equilibrium the H-type must not obtain less than in the pooling equilibrium in which both
types choose the no-name seller. This reflects the intuitive idea that brands face competition
from the no-name seller. The two criteria can be formally merged as follows.
Suppose there are two equilibria e and e such that the L-type chooses the no-name seller in
e and e. Let uH (e) be the H-type’s utility in equilibrium e. Then:
uH (e) > uH (e)⇒ e is selected.30 ,31 (SC)
28This is without loss of generality even though there might be separating equilibria in which the L-type con-
sumes from a brand that happens to quote a 0 price. However, to each such equilibrium, there is a corresponding
equilibrium in which the L-type chooses the no-name good, but with equal profits and utilities otherwise.
29The assumption that ties are broken in favour of separation, is for simplicity only.
30The argument is in the spirit of “forward induction” (see Kohlberg and Mertens 1986). The H-type could
publicly announce: “Look, the L-type chooses the no-name seller anyway. So, it is up to my choice which
equilibrium is played. But I am better off in e than in e. So I will choose the seller according to my equilibrium
strategy in e.” If the other players believe the announcements, they prefer to play e, and given the other players
play e, the H-type prefers to stick to his announcement. Thus, the announcement is credible. Notice also
that the L-type cannot credibly announce that he, say pools with an H-type who consumes at a positive price,
because given the other players believe his announcment, he would not want to stick to it.
31Equilibria are often refined by the intuitive criterion (see Cho and Kreps 1987). In the current setup, the
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To break ties, we assume that if the H-type is indifferent between two equilibria, then the equi-
librium is selected, in which the H-type consumes from the brand with the higher advertising.32
If both brand’s advertising is the same in both equilibria, then each equilibrium is selected with
probability 1/2.
In the next Lemma, we derive constraints on σ from the IC and SC constraints.
Lemma 2 Let e be a separating equilibrium satisfying (ICH) and (ICL). Then it holds:
(i) σ ≤ 1.
(ii) If σ ∈ (µL, 1), then the H-type is worse off in e than in the pooling equilibrium in which
both types choose the no-name seller, thus (SC) selects the pooling equilibrium.
The intuition is straightforward. (i) is a common sorting condition. If σ > 1, then at any price
at which an H-type is willing to consume a brand in exchange for its more desirable image,
an L-type is even more happy to do so. Hence, an L-type cannot be deterred from mimicking
the H-type, and incentive compatibility breaks down. As for (ii), if σ is large, brands need to
quote high prices to prevent the L-type from purchasing the brand. This price outweighs the
H-type’s image gain from separation in comparison to pooling. In light of Lemma 2, we assume
from now on that σ ≤ µL.
We are now in the position to derive the pricing-consumption equilibrium. Intuitively, if S1
advertises more than S2, an H-type is willing to pay more for S1 than for S2, because when
purchasing brand S1 it is more likely that he meets a contact who recognizes brand S1 and
awards him the respective status. Consequently, S1 will use this advantage and attract all
H-types. If both brands’ advertising is the same, this advantage is absent. S1 and S2 will then
reduce prices until a further reduction would attract L-types. Proposition 1 characterizes the
equilibrium formally.
intuitive criterion is too weak, because the public can only partially identify brands. If there are two separating
equilibria, the one in which the H-type is worse off might still survive. This is so because an out-of-equilibrium
deviation to the non-selling brand must be attributed to the L-type if the contact does not recognize the non-
selling brand. This reduces the H-type’s incentive to “break” the equilibrium. For details see the remark after
the proof of Propostion 1 in the appendix.
32This includes the case when the H-type is indifferent between the pooling and a separating equilibrium.
Then the latter is selected.
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Proposition 1 Let α1 ≥ α2. Then for all prices the selection criterion (SC) selects a signalling
equilibrium that is unique up to out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Furthermore, there is a unique pricing
equilibrium such that:
(i) S2 sets price p2 = λLα2 and does not make sales if α1 > α2;
(ii) S1 sets a price such that an H-type is just indifferent between S1 and S2, i.e.
p1 = λLα2 + λHµL (α1 − α2) ,
and S1 makes sales to all H-types, if α1 > α2; and
(iii) all L-types purchase the no-name product.
To illustrate the intuition, suppose α1 > α2. Bertrand competition implies that the non-selling
brand, S2, chooses the smallest price such that the L-type, conditional on the H-type choosing
brand S2(!), would still choose the no-name seller. S2 thereby offers the same signalling value
as brand S1. Despite making no sales and pricing above marginal cost, it is not profitable for
S2 to reduce her price, because this would attract L-types and worsen S2’s signalling value.
Moreover, the selling brand, S1, needs to quote a price such that the H-type, conditional on
choosing S1 is (weakly) better off than in the continuation game that would follow if he chose
S2. S1’s higher advertising allows her to do so at a price higher than p2. Profit maximization
implies that S1 leaves an H-type with the same utility that he would obtain if he chose S2.
The proposition illuminates the main positive features mentioned in the Introduction. First,
given the rival brand’s advertising, a brand’s price increases directly in her own advertising.
Second, advertising leads to market segmentation and allows the selling brand to quote a price
above marginal cost. Thus, advertising can be seen as product differentiation and as a means
to avoid competition with no-name sellers.
In what follows, two boundary cases will be important. Fix α1. Then, if α2 = 0, S1 acts as
a monopolist in the “premium segment” and can charge the monopoly price
pm = λHµLα1.
pm is just low enough that anH-type is still willing to consume brand S1 instead of the no-name
good. If α2 = α1, there is perfect competition between brands, and they charge the competitive
price
pc = λLα1.
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pc is just high enough to prevent an L-type from consuming a brand.
Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) argue that equilibrium prices above marginal cost are an
artefact of consumers being restricted to consume one unit of a fixed quality at a time. This
raises concerns against the use of the type of equilibria described in Proposition 1. However,
the assumption of unit consumption might be appropriate in some circumstances. Moreover,
Bagwell and Bernheim have a second result which says that under a tangency condition33, mark-
up pricing can be sustained in equilibrium even if quantity and quality can be varied. Since our
main objective is to derive implications for advertising in a situation in which consumers’ image
concerns allow sellers to charge mark-ups, we choose the simplest model that generates this
feature. This is justified by Bagwell and Bernheim’s second result that shows that a non-trivial
class of models exhibits mark-up pricing.
A final remark concerns the case when both types want to signal their types, i.e. λL > 0.
Similar to the equilibrium described by Proposition 1, there is an equilibrium in which one
type, say type L, consumes the no-name good at price 0, and type R consumes from brand
S1. The key difference to the case with λL < 0 is that now type L does not want to mimic
type R. Hence, any positive price p1 prevents the L-type from purchasing brand S1. Thus, the
competitive price is 0, the equilibrium price of the selling brand is p1 = λHµL (α1 − α2), and
that of the non-selling brand is p2 = 0.34
4 Advertising and entry
This section studies the brands’ advertising choices when advertising is sequential and S1 (the
incumbent) moves first and S2 (the entrant) moves second. This order of moves is the same as
in Schmalensee’s (1983) seminal entry deterrence model. We begin with the monopoly case as
33The tangency condition says that consumption-wealth indifference curves have one point in common and
are tangent at this point. In our setup with quasi-linear utility, indifference curves are straight lines, and so the
tangency condition cannot hold.
34In addition, there is an equilibrium where no one consumes the no-name brand and each type consumes from
a separate premium brand at a positive price. Such an equilibrium might be sustained by out-of-equilibirum
beliefs that assign the a priori image to the no-name seller. Accordingly, the market is split in two premium
segments, and to capture competition between brands, one would need to consider at least four brands, two for
each premium segment. In this case, it is still true that in each premium segment the competitive price and
thus the price quoted by the non-selling brand is 0.
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a benchmark and then turn to the entry and entry deterrence decision.
4.1 Monopoly
Suppose that S2 cannot advertise, i.e. α2 = 0. Then S1 sets the monopoly price pm = µLλHα1.
Hence, the monopoly profit is πm (α1) = µHpm − (1/2) cα21, and monopoly advertising is given
by
αm =
λHµLµH
c
∧ 1.
4.2 Optimal entry strategy
Suppose now that S2 can advertise and potentially enter the premium segment. If S2 advertises
less than S1, she does not make sales in the post-entry game. Because S2’s profit is discontinuous
at S1’s advertising α1, matching α1 is always dominated by slightly “overbidding” α1. If S2
just overbids S1’s advertising by an ε, she charges the competitive price pc = λL (α1 + ε).
If α1 becomes large, overbidding becomes less profitable, as advertising costs increase. The
advertising level αc is defined as the largest advertising level such that S2 breaks even by
just overbidding, i.e. limε↓0 π2 (α2 = αc + ε,α1 = αc) = 0. We refer to αc as the competitive
advertising level. It holds that π2 (α2 = αc + ε,α1 = αc) = µHλL (α1 + ε) − (1/2) c (α1 + ε)2.
Hence,
αc =
2λLµH
c
∧ 1.
To avoid rather uninteresting corner cases, we assume from now on that c is large enough such
that αc∨αm < 1. In this case, straightforward algebra yields: αc > αm if and only if σ > µL/2.
Lemma 3 describes the optimal entry strategy in terms of αc and αm.
Lemma 3 (i) S2’s optimal entry strategy α∗2 (α1) against α1 < 1 is given as follows:
(A) If α1 < αm, then
α∗2 (α1) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
αm if α1 < (µHµ2Lλ
2
H) / (2c (λHµL − λL))
0 otherwise.
(B) If α1 ≥ αm, then
α∗2 (α1) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
limε↓0 α1 + ε if α1 < αc
0 if α1 ≥ αc.
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(ii) S2’s optimal entry strategy against α1 = 1 is α∗2 (1) = 0.
If α1 < αm, then monopoly advertising is the optimal entry strategy unless α1 is too large to
allow S2 to quote a post-entry price that covers advertising costs. Similarly, for α1 ≥ αm, S2
optimally advertises just a bit more than S1 unless α1 is too large for S2 to break even. Hence,
for α1 > αc, S2 stays out of the market. Finally, if α1 = 1, then S2 serves half of the H-types
if he, too, sets α2 = 1. However, given the abovementioned cost restriction, this does not cover
costs, and S2 stays out.
4.3 Entry deterrence
We are now in the position to state our central entry deterrence result.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the incumbent chooses α∗1 = α
c ∨ αm, and the entrant chooses
α∗2 = 0. More precisely:
(i) If σ ≤ µL/2, then α∗1 = αm, and entry is blockaded in the sense of Bain.
(ii) If σ > µL/2, then α∗1 = α
c, and entry is effectively impeded in the sense of Bain.
The incumbent can deter entry, because her advertising reduces S2’s profits if S2 were to
exceed S1’s advertising. Whether the incumbent strategically overinvests or advertises like a
monopolist depends on σ. If σ is low, the competitive price is not large enough for S2 to make
profits given S1 chooses monopoly advertising. Hence, monopoly advertising is sufficient to
keep S2 out of the market.
Conversely, if σ is low, the competitive price is high and allows S2 to make profits even if
S1 chooses monopoly advertising. Hence, S1 needs to advertise beyond the monopoly level to
keep S2 out, resulting in overinvestment.
We close the entry section by commenting on the case λL < 0. Recall from the end of
the previous section that in this case the competitive price is 0 when the entrant just overbids
the incumbent. Thus, this case corresponds to the case with σ = 0, and entry will always be
blockaded.
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5 Advertising and welfare
The objective of this section is to examine the welfare properties of the equilibrium. For
simplicity, we take a utilitarian perspective and take total surplus as welfare measure.35 We
first provide a general expression for consumer rent and total surplus and then determine the
socially optimal level of advertising. We then compare this to both monopoly and duopoly
with sequential advertising, and finally compare monopoly and duopoly when advertising is
simultaneous.
5.1 Consumer rent and total surplus
To compute consumer and total surplus when types separate, suppose that α1 and α2 are given.
Suppose further that type H chooses brand b ∈ {1, 2} at price pb, that type L chooses the no-
name seller at p0 = 0, and no one chooses eb ∈ {1, 2} ,eb 6= b. Note that because no one chooseseb, a member of the public cannot better identify a type even if she is informed about eb. Thus,
with probability αb, type t is identified, in which case he obtains image utility λteγt where we
define eγH = 1 and eγL = 0. And with probability 1− αb, he receives the a priori image utility
λtµH , i.e. type t’s utility is given by
ut = u+ λteγt + λtµH (1− αb)− pt
= vt + λt (eγt − µH)αb − pt, (2)
where we define vt = u + λtµH . Utility is composed of three parts. vt is the utility if there is
no advertising. The term λt (eγt − µH)αb is a type’s image change through advertising, and pt
is the price paid by type t.
Total surplus is then simply the sum over consumers’ utilities and sellers’ profits. Since S2
does not make sales, and since S1’s profit equals the monetary transfer from an H-type minus
advertising cost, total surplus is given by
TS (α1,α2) = v + (λH − λL)µHµLα1 −
1
2
cα21 −
1
2
cα22, (3)
where v is defined as vHµH + vLµL.
35A question arises as to what the utility of a consumer’s contact is. To keep things simple, we do not
introduce an additional utility function for contacts, but assume that a contact’s utility is included in λt. This
seems reasonable e.g. in a matching context.
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When types pool, we suppose they choose the no-name seller. Hence, they receive their a
priori image utility with probability 1 at price 0. Total surplus is then TSpool = v.
5.2 First best advertising
To determine the first best, we think of a social planner who acts as a benevolent monopolist
and chooses advertising and price so as to maximize total surplus. The planner’s information,
consumers’ and the public’s behavior, and the selection criterion is the same as in the case
with profit-maximizing sellers. In principle, the planner could advertise both brands. However,
given our indifference rule, only one brand makes sales in a separating equilibrium such that
the advertising of the non-selling brand would be pure waste. So without loss of generality,
α2 = 0. In this case, (3) obviously dominates TSpool, and optimizing (3) with respect to α1
gives the first best advertising level
αFB =
(λH − λL)µHµL
c
.36
5.3 Monopoly and sequential advertising
5.3.1 Monopoly
The comparison of αFB with monopoly advertising αm = λHµHµL/c implies the following
observation:
Lemma 4 There is too much advertising in monopoly (i.e. αm > αFB).
The reason is straightforward. Advertising affects surplus in two ways. It improves the image
of an H-type and worsens the image of an L-type. The monopolist does not take into account
the detrimental effect of her higher visibility on an L-type and hence advertises too much.
The planner can achieve first best by increasing the costs of advertising, e.g. by imposing an
advertising tax. A more crude policy measure is to ban advertising altogether. An advertising
ban is often advocated by political activists in the name of consumer protection (see Klein
2000). We shall now briefly discuss the impact of an advertising ban on consumer rents and on
total surplus.
36By our assumption on c, αFB is always less than 1.
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5.3.2 Monopoly and advertising ban
When advertising is prohibited, each consumer type receives the a priori image utility. Thus,
type t receives the utility ubant = vt. In monopoly, by (2), type H obtains u
m
H = vH+λHµLα
m−
pm. Because pm = ∆λHµLαm, we get that umH = vH = u
ban
H . That is, the H-type’s image gain
is entirely appropriated by the monopolist. Moreover, an L-type obtains umL = vL − λLµHαm.
Therefore, since λL > 0, a consumer type L benefits from an advertising ban, because he can
avoid the stigma of being identified as an L-type. We summarize this observation in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 In monopoly, an advertising ban makes consumers (weakly) better off.
An advertising ban forgoes the producer surplus created by advertising. By (3), the difference
between total surplus under an advertising ban and in monopoly is given by
TSban − TSm = − (λH − λL)µHµLαm +
1
2
c (αm)2 .
A little bit of algebra yields that this is positive if σ < 1/2, i.e. an advertising ban improves
total surplus when the monopolist’s profit (which is proportional to λH) is not too large relative
to an L-type’s loss (which is proportional to λL) from advertising.
5.3.3 Sequential advertising
Proposition 2 implies that when an incumbent faces an entrant, there is never less advertising
than in monopoly. Thus, the conclusion of Lemma 4 is reinforced when entry is possible:
Lemma 6 When advertising is sequential, there is too much advertising. Moreover, social
surplus in the case with potential entry is (weakly) smaller than in monopoly when no entry is
possible.
The presence of the entrant reduces surplus because it might induce the incumbent to engage
in inefficient deterrence advertising. Also the consumers do not benefit from the presence of a
potential entrant, as it does not reduce the incumbent’s price relative to a monopolist’s. In this
sense, the threat of competition reduces social surplus because it triggers wasteful rent-seeking
activities. This pattern also prevails when advertising is simultaneous.
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5.4 Simultaneous advertising and competition
5.4.1 Equilibrium
When sellers choose their advertising levels simultaneously, the advertising game is an all-pay
auction with quadratic bid costs where the loser prize is 0, and the winner prize is the revenue
from making sales to the H-consumers. Because a seller’s profit function is discontinuous in
advertising, there is generally no equilibrium in pure strategies. We have the following result.
Proposition 3 When advertising is simultaneous, then it holds:
(i) If αm ≥ αc, then there are two pure advertising equilibria (α1,α2) = (αm, 0) and (α1,α2) =
(0,αm).
(ii) If αm < αc, then there is no pure advertising equilibrium. There is a mixed strategy
equilibrium where a seller’s advertising strategy is given by the uniform distribution on [0,α]
with
α =
(λHµL + λL)µH
c
.37
In this case, both sellers’ expected equilibrium profit is 0.
An equilibrium in pure strategies exists only when it is unprofitable to overbid the monopoly
advertising level (αm ≥ αc). In the other case, a pure equilibrium fails to exist. To see why the
equilibrium strategy is uniform, notice first that in a mixed equilibrium, a seller’s profit needs to
be constant in advertising levels. Second, by Proposition 1, the winner prize increases linearly
in one’s own advertising, and advertising costs are quadratic. Therefore, if the probability
of winning is linear in one’s own advertising, a seller’s expected benefit from advertising is
quadratic and “cancels” with advertising costs, leading to constant profits.
Under (ii), sellers expend all their prospective profits in the advertising contest in an attempt
to win an advantage in the post-advertising pricing game and thus end up with 0 overall profits.
This is a standard result in all-pay auctions.
5.4.2 Surplus
The objective of the rest of this section is to compare welfare in monopoly and duopoly. We
first compare total surplus and then turn to consumer rents. We assume that αm < αc. Recall
37Assume that c is large enough such that α < 1.
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that this is equivalent to σ > µL/2.
Let αd = E [max {α1,α2}] be the expected equilibrium advertising level of the selling brand.
Likewise, let cd = E [(1/2) cα21 + (1/2) cα
2
2] be expected equilibrium advertising costs. A little
bit of algebra yields αd = (2/3)α and cd = (1/2) (3/2) c
¡
αd
¢2
. Using this in (3) gives total
duopoly surplus
TSd = v + (λH − λL)µHµLαd −
1
2
3
2
c
¡
αd
¢2
.
Recall that total monopoly surplus is
TSm = v + (λH − λL)µHµLαm −
1
2
c (αm)2 .
Two effects determine the comparison between TSd and TSm. On the one hand, there is a cost
effect. In duopoly, since only the winning seller’s advertising matters for a consumer’s image,
the loser’s advertising is useless and pure waste from a welfare perspective. αd is therefore
supplied at an inefficiently high cost. (This is reflected by the higher cost coefficient in TSd.)
On the other hand, duopoly advertising is higher than monopoly advertising.38 This is so,
because a seller’s advertising is stimulated by the prospect of achieving positive profits in the
premium segment. Accordingly, advertising in duopoly is even further away from first best
than in monopoly, hence the following result.39
Lemma 7 When advertising is simultaneous, then total surplus in duopoly is less than total
surplus in monopoly
While in this sense, competition is detrimental to welfare, a more differentiated picture emerges
when consumer rents are considered, because in this case also prices matter. By Proposition 1,
the expected equilibrium duopoly price pd in the premium market is
pd = E [λHµLmax {α1,α2}− (λHµL − λL)min {α1,α2}] .
38Notice that αm < αc is equivalent to αm < αd, hence monopoly advertising is always lower than duopoly
advertising.
39The result is similar to a result in Pesendorfer (1995). In his setting, an increase in sellers leads to more
designs being available and this increase in variety is wasteful because the availability of more than one design
does not improve the sorting of consumers but only increases the costs of supplying designs. The same logic
applies in our advertising framework.
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A little bit of straightforward algebra gives that pd = (1/2) (∆λHµL + λL)αd. By (2), con-
sumers’ utilities are thus
udH = vH + λHµLα
d − pd = vH +
1
2
(λHµL − λL)αd, (4)
udL = vL − λLµHαd. (5)
An L-type is not affected by price, because he consumes the free good anyway. So he only cares
for whether there is more advertising in duopoly or monopoly. As mentioned above, αd > αm.
Thus, an L-type is always worse off in duopoly. An H-type, however, is affected by price. In
monopoly, his image gain is just taken away by the monopolist. In duopoly, advertising makes
brands more similar. Thus prices fall and make an H-type better off than in monopoly.
Lemma 8 When advertising is simultaneous, then an H-type is better off and an L-type is
worse off in duopoly than in monopoly.
We close this section with two remarks. First, note that our welfare results hinge on the
assumption that the good is intrinsically homogeneous and all consumers purchase a good.
This implies that all inefficiencies result from inefficiencies in advertising but not in trade. If
consumer types’ willingness to pay is heterogeneous, monopoly pricing might exclude some
consumers, and this might improve the welfare properties of duopoly relative to monopoly.
Second, our welfare results depend critically on the assumption that λL > 0. If λL ≤ 0,
then each type benefits from separation. In particular, consider the equilibrium informally
discussed at the end of section 3. Since the competitive price is 0, it follows that the competitive
advertising level αc is 0 and thus always smaller than αm. In this case, under both sequential
and simultaneous advertising, the equilibrium outcome will be that exactly one brand advertises
like a monopolist and the other brand does not advertise. But since λL ≤ 0, advertising exerts a
positive externality on the L-type. Hence, there is generally too little advertising in equilibrium,
and an advertising ban can never be beneficial.
6 Conclusion
The paper studies the role of advertising in the process of conspicuous consumption. The key
idea is that advertising informs the public about brand names and thus creates the possibility
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of conspicuous consumption by rendering brands a signalling device. By linking advertising and
conspicuous consumption in this way, we provide a foundation, based on optimization behavior,
for persuasive approaches to advertising. We derive an overinvestment entry deterrence result
that is novel to the formal advertising literature and also derive some unconventional welfare
implications.
While in this paper consumers care only about their image conveyed to others, psychological
research suggests that individuals also engage in activities that allow them to hold favorable
views about themselves (see e.g. Bem 1972). Thus, brands could also be seen as self-signalling
devices when consumers have imperfect self-knowledge. The issues that arise from such a
perspective are left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Towards a contradiction, suppose the L-type chooses brand bL ∈ {1, 2}
in a separating equilibrium at price pL > 0. Suppose first that bL = 1. Hence, the H-type
chooses either S2 or S0, and consistency of beliefs implies
γ1,2H (bL) = 0, γ
1
H (bL) = 0, γ
2
H (bL) =
dH (0, p)µH
dH (0, p)µH + µL
, γ∅H (bL) = µH ,
and
γ1,2H (0) ≥ 0, γ1H (0) ≥ 0, γ2H (0) =
dH (0, p)µH
dH (0, p)µH + µL
, γ∅H (0) = µH .
Hence, the public’s belief of facing type is H upon observing the no-name product is never
smaller than its belief of facing type is H upon observing bL. Thus, because λL > 0, L’s image
utility can only rise when he consumes the no-name product instead of consuming bL. Moreover
pL > 0, while the no-name product is free. Thus, type L would benefit by deviating from bL
to the no-name seller which is in contradiction to the assumption that bL was his equilibrium
choice. The same argument works if bL = 2. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2: As for (i). Suppose a separating equilibrium exists. Then at least
one seller, say S1, needs to advertise (otherwise, a contact cannot distinguish any brand names
and there cannot be separation). So suppose α1 > 0. Consider the case in which an H-type
consumes from S1. (The case in which the H-type consumes from S2 can be treated similarly.)
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By assumption, an L-type consumes from the no-name seller. Consistency of beliefs therefore
implies
γ1,2H (1) = 1, γ
1
H (1) = 1, γ
2
H (1) = µH , γ
∅
H (1) = µH ,
and
γ1,2H (0) = 0, γ
1
H (0) = 0, γ
2
H (0) = µH , γ
∅
H (0) = µH .
Using these beliefs in (1) gives type L’s incentive to choose S1 rather than S0 as
∆uL (1, 0) = λL [(1− 0)α1α2 + (1− 0)α1 (1− α2)
+ (µH − µH) (1− α1)α2 + (µH − µH) (1− α1) (1− α2)]− p1,
which simplifies to
∆uL (1, 0) = λLα1 − p1. (6)
Similarly, it follows that
∆uH (1, 0) = λHα1 − p1. (7)
Incentive compatibility requires ∆uL (1, 0) ≤ 0 and ∆uH (1, 0) ≥ 0. By (6) and (7) this can be
true only if λH ≥ λL, that is, only if σ ≤ 1. This proves part (i).
As for (ii), let σ ∈ (µL, 1). Consider first the pooling equilibrium, say e, in which both types
consume from the no-name seller at price 0. In e, an H-type receives the a priori image utility
with probability 1. Hence, uH (e) = u+ λHµH .
Let now e be a separating equilibrium and consider the same case as in (i). We want to
show that uH (e) < uH (e). To see this, notice first that in e, by (6), p1 ≥ λLα1.
Second, using the public’s beliefs, an H-type’s expected equilibrium utility in e is given by
uH (e) = u+ λHα1 + λHµH (1− α1)− p1,
which can also be written as uH (e) + λHµLα1 − p1. Because p1 ≥ λLα1, we obtain that
uH (e) ≤ uH (e) + (λHµL − λL)α1.
Finally, because σ ∈ (µL, 1), we have that λHµL − λL < 0. Thus, uH (e) < uH (e), and this
completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1: In what follows, we denote the conjectured equilibrium price stated
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in Proposition 1 by p∗1 and p
∗
2 and shall use plain p1 and p2 to denote generic prices. We first
consider the case α1 > α2. We begin by describing the candidate signalling equilibria for given
(p1, p2): an L-type always chooses S0. An H-type’s choice is illustrated in Figure 1. Here,
pcb = λLαb and p
m
b = λHµLαb, b = 1, 2. Notice that p
c
2 = p
∗
2. A letter i ∈ I = {0, 1, 2} indicates
the H-type’s choice in this area. The little arrows point towards the H-type’s choice on the
boundary of areas with different choices. The circle indicates the candidate price equilibrium
(p∗1, p
∗
2).
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Figure 1: signalling equilibria for α1 > α2
We denote by ei the candidate signalling equilibrium in which the L-type chooses S0 and the
H-type chooses i ∈ I. Table 1 specifies a contact’s belief in e1 that she faces type H, given her
knowledge k, a consumer choice i, and prices p (i.e. γkH (i|p)).
k = (1, 2) k = 1 k = 2 k = ∅
i = 1 1 1 µH µH
i = 2 ζ 0 ζ µH
i = 0 0 0 µH µH
Table 1
Notice that the second line specifies out-of-equilibrium beliefs: conditional on observing and
recognizing 2, the contact assigns an arbitrary but fixed probability ζ ∈ [0, 1] to the event that
she faces type H. However, not recognizing 2 (k = 1 or k = ∅) are not out-of-equilibrium
events. In particular, if the contact encounters brand 1 but recognizes 2 only, then she deduces
that she faces type L. This is because no one chooses 2 in e1, so she would recognize the choice
as 1 if she faced type H.
In e2, beliefs are specified alike, and in e0 we assume for simplicity that the contact always
holds the a priori belief µ.
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We now show that the candidate equilibrium thus described is an equilibrium indeed and
is selected by our criterion. To do so, we use the following claims that we show below. Let
b = 1, 2, then it holds:
(a) pb < pcb ⇒ eb is not an equilibrium.
(b) pb > pmb ⇒ uH (e0) > uH (eb).
(c) pb ∈ [pcb, pmb ]⇒ eb is an equilibrium and uH (eb) > uH (e0)
(d) For (p1, p2) ∈ [pc1, pm1 ]× [pc2, pm2 ]: uH (e1) ≥ uH (e2)⇔ p1 − p2 ≤ λHµL (α1 − α2) .
We shall now go through the price space and deduce from (a)-(d) that the candidate equi-
librium is selected. In region [0, pc1) × [0, pc2), (a) implies that e0 is the only equilibrium and
thus selected in this region. In (pm1 ,∞) × (pm2 ,∞), (b) implies that e0 is selected due to SC.
In [0, pc1) × (pm2 ,∞), (a) implies that e1 is not an equilibrium, and (b) implies that e0 is se-
lected due to SC. Likewise, in (pm1 ,∞) × [0, pc2), e0 is selected. In [0, pc1) × [pc2, pm2 ], (a) and
(c) imply that e2 and e0 are the only equilibria and because of the second claim in (c), SC
selects e2. Likewise, in [pc1, p
m
1 ]× [0, pc2), e1 is selected. Finally, in [pc1, pm1 ]× [pc2, pm2 ], (c) and (d)
implies that all three equilibria exist. (c) and (d) together with SC imply that e1 is selected if
p1 − p2 < λHµL (α1 − α2). If p1 − p2 = λHµL (α1 − α2), then our tie-breaking rule selects e1,
because α1 > α2 by assumption.
This establishes that the candidate equilibrium is a signalling equilibrium indeed. Notice
also, that the selection criterion selects exactly one equilibrium. Thus the selection is unique
up to to out-of-equilibrium beliefs ζ. It remains to show that p∗1 and p
∗
2 are equilibrium prices.
But this can be seen directly from Figure 1: if S2 reduces or increases price, e1 is selected,
and S2 does not make sales. If S1 increases price, e2 is selected, and S1 loses all sales. If she
reduces price, e1 is still selected, but she gets a smaller price. Since at the equilibrium price,
e1 is selected, features (i)-(iii) stated in Proposition 1 hold true.
To complete the proof, we have to show claims (a) to (d). We prove the claims only for
b = 1 (the proof for b = 2 is identical).
As for (a): We prove that in e1 the constraint ICL is violated. Using the beliefs in the first and
third row in Table 1 in (1) gives an L-type’s incentive to choose 1 rather than 0:
∆uL (1, 0) = λL [(1− 0)α1α2 + (1− 0)α1 (1− α2)
+ (µH − µH) (1− α1)α2 + (µH − µH) (1− α1) (1− α2)]− p1.
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This simplifies to ∆uL (1, 0) = λLα1 − p1. Hence, because p1 < pc1 = λLα1 by assumption, it
follows that ∆uL (1, 0) > 0, a contradiction to ICL. This completes (a).
As for (b): We first compute an H-type’s utility in e1. Using the first row in Table 1 gives:
uH (e1) = u+ λHα1 + λHµH (1− α1)− p1
= u+ λHµH + λHµLα1 − p1.
Likewise, in e0, an H-type’s utility is uH (e0) = u + λHµH . Since, p1 > pm1 = λHµLα1 by
assumption, comparison of uH (e0) and uH (e1) yields the claim immediately. This completes
(b).
As for (c): For existence, we simply check the IC constraints. Identical computations as in (a)
yield that ∆uL (1, 0) ≤ 0. Likewise, it is easy to check that ∆uH (1, 0) ≥ 0. Moreover, the
claim that uH (e1) > uH (e0) follows from identical computations as in (b). This completes (c).
As for (d): We compute the H-type’s utility in the respective equilibria. By the same calcula-
tions as in (b), we obtain for b = 1, 2:
uH (eb) = u+ λHµH + λHµLαb − pb.
Comparison of uH (e1) and uH (e2) yields the claim immediately. This completes (d).
Finally, if α1 = α2, the candidate equilibrium looks similar as in Figure 1 except that now
the rectangular region between pc1 and p
∗
1 disappears, and in region [p
c
1, p
m
1 ]× [pc2, pm2 ], if p1 = p2,
then e1 and e2 are each played with probability 1/2. It follows then from identical arguments
as in the case α1 > α2 that the candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium indeed and is selected
by our selection criterion. This completes the proof. ¤
Remark: In this remark, we illustrate why the intuitive criterion in the style of Cho and
Kreps (1987) does not rule out separating equilibria that appear implausible in our context.
Consider the case α1 > α2. Recall from claim (c) in the proof of Proposition 1 that for
(p1, p2) ∈ [pc1, pm1 ] × [pc2, pm2 ] both e1 and e2 are equilibria. Suppose that the price difference
p1 − p2 is slightly larger than λHµL (α1 − α2). In this case, claim (d) shows that e1 does not
survive our selection criterion. We shall now show that, by contrast, e1 is not ruled out by the
intuitive criterion. To do so, we first show that in e1, S2 is a dominated choice for type L for all
out-of-equilibrium beliefs ζ. Indeed, by Table 1 and (1), in e1 an L-type’s incentive to choose
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2 rather than 0 is given by
∆uL (2, 0) = λL [(ζ − 0)α1α2 + (0− 0)α1 (1− α2)
+ (ζ − µH) (1− α1)α2 + (µH − µH) (1− α1) (1− α2)]− p2.
Because ζ ≤ 1, this is smaller than λL [α1α2 + (1− µH) (1− α1)α2] − p2. Hence, since p2 ≥
pc2 = λLα2, it follows that ∆uL (2, 0) ≤ 0.
Therefore, S2 is equilibrium dominated for the L-type, and the intuitive criterion would
break e1 if the H-type wanted to deviate to S2, given ζ = 1. However, this is not the case.
Indeed, given ζ = 1, it follows from Table 1 and (1), that in e1 an H-type’s incentive to choose
2 rather than 1 is
∆uH (2, 1) = λH [(1− 1)α1α2 + (0− 1) α1 (1− α2)
+ (1− µH) (1− α1)α2 + (µH − µH) (1− α1) (1− α2)]− p2 + p1.
The key point to notice is that γ1H (2) = 0, because conditional on k = 1, the contact does not
detect the out-of-equilibrium move of choosing S2 (this is reflected by the second entry in the
squared bracket). This reduces the H-type’s incentive to deviate to S2. Indeed, ∆uH (2, 1) can
be straightforwardly re-arranged to −λHµL (α1 − α2) − λHµHα1 (1− α2) − p2 + p1. Hence, if
p1 − p2 is slightly larger than λHµL (α1 − α2), the incentive to deviate to S2 is slightly larger
than −λHµHα1 (1− α2) which is non-positive, and this is what we sought to show. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose first that α1 < 1. Because S2’s demand makes a discrete
upward jump at α2 = α1 and advertising costs are continuous, matching S1’s advertising is
dominated by advertising slightly but strictly more than S1. For α1 < α2, S2’s profit is given
by
π2 (α2,α1) = µH [λHµLα2 + (λL − λHµL)α1]− (1/2) cα22,
and the first order condition is solved by monopoly advertising αm = λHµLµH/c. If α1 < αm,
then S2 optimally chooses α2 = αm unless this yields negative profits, i.e. unless π2 (αm,α1) ≤ 0.
A little bit of algebra shows that this condition is equivalent to α1 ≥ (µHµ2Lλ2H) / (2c (λHµL − λL)),
and this establishes part (A) of the Lemma.
If α1 ≥ αm2 ≤, then S2 optimally chooses α2 = α1 + ε for small ε unless this yields negative
profits, i.e. unless limε↓0 π2 (α1 + ε,α1) ≤ 0. By definition of αc, this condition is equivalent to
α1 ≥ αc, and this establishes part (B) of the Lemma.
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Suppose finally that α1 = 1. Then S2 can at most match S1’s advertising and makes no
sales otherwise. If S2 chooses α2 = 1, he sells to all H-types at the competitive price pc = λL
with probability 1/2. Thus, her profit is π2 (1, 1) = (1/2)µHλL−(1/2) c. This is non-negative if
c ≤ λLµH . But because, by assumption, αc = 2λLµH/c < 1, we have that c > 2λLµH > λLµH .
Therefore, α2 = 1 cannot be the optimal response, and this completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2: Inspection of α∗1 implies that S2 optimally chooses α∗1 = αc∨αm un-
less this yields negative profits. However, S1 makes always non-negative profits when α1 = α∗1.
To see this, notice that α2 = αc is S2’s break-even point given S1 chooses α1 = αc and all
H-types purchase from S2. Moreover, the price of the seller who advertises more falls in the
advertising of her rival. Hence, S1 cannot do worse than break even when she chooses α1 = αc,
given S2 chooses α2 = 0 and all H-types purchase from S1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3: As for (i): Let αm ≥ αc. By definition of αm2 , the best response
against α = 0 is αm. As for the best response against αm, notice that overbidding αm leads to
losses, because αm exceeds the break even advertising level αc. Moreover, bidding a positive
amount less than αm has costs only but no benefits. Thus, the best response against αm is
α = 0.
As for (ii): Let αm < αc. Suppose, there is a pure strategy equilibrium (α1,α2). Suppose first
α1 = α2. Then each seller serves the premium market with probability 1/2. By bidding slightly
more, either seller would capture the whole market at the same price. Hence, a seller could
gain a strictly positive amount at a negligible additional cost. Suppose next that, say α1 > α2.
Then S2 does not make sales, thus she sets α2 = 0, and makes 0 profits. S1’s best reply is thus
α1 = αm. Because αm < αc, S2 could make positive profits by slightly overbidding α1 = αm.
Thus, no equilibrium in pure strategies exist.
To establish that the proposed strategy is an equilibrium, let F be the c.d.f. of the uniform
distribution on [0,α]. We have to show that the expected profit for, say S1, given S2 plays the
mixed strategy F , is (A) constant for all α1 ∈ [0,α] and (B) does not increase for α1 > α. As
for (A), S1’s profit is 0 for α1 < α2, the event α1 = α2 has zero probability, and he sells to all
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H-types at the equilibrium price for α1 > α2. Therefore, S1’s expected profit is
π1 (α1;F ) = µH
Z α1
0
λLα2 + λHµL (α1 − α2) dα2
1
α
− 1
2
cα21.
Solving the integral and collecting terms gives
π1 (α1;F ) =
∙
µH (λHµL + λL)
1
α
− c
¸
× 1
2
α21.
But by definition of α, the term in the squared brackets vanishes, and this establishes (A).
As for (B), note that by spending α1 > α, S1 sells to all H-types with probability 1, and
therefore obtains expected profit
π1 (α1;F ) = µH
∙
λHµLα1 − (λHµL − λL)
Z α
0
α2dF (α2)
¸
− 1
2
cα21.
With
R α
0
α2dF (α2) = (1/2)α, we get
π1 (α1;F ) = λHµHµLα1 −
1
2
µH (λHµL − λL)α−
1
2
cα21.
Because α1 > α, the cost term is strictly less than − (1/2) cα2. Hence, the last three terms in
π1 (α1;F ) are strictly less than − (1/2)α [µH (λHµL − λL) + cα]. Inserting α into the squared
brackets yields that the squared bracket can be written as 2λHµL. Combining this with the first
term in π1 (α1;F ) yields that µHλHµL (α1 − α) is a strict upper bound on π1 (α1;F ). Because
α1 > α, this bound is strictly negative, and thus S1 cannot gain by deviating to an advertising
level larger than α. ¤
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